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Venture capital investors provide crucial financing which enables the growth and 
development of small and medium sized enterprises ("SMEs"). (1) For early stage or rapidly 
developing firms, which frequently have insufficient assets or collateral to secure traditional 
bank financing, venture capital is often the only financing option available. According to a 
survey of business conditions conducted by Statistics Canada in October of 1994, the largest 
impediment to expansion for SMEs, aside from the need for more orders, is access to 
capital. In addition, numerous studies, most notably the Canadian House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Industry in its report Taking Care of Small Business, have pointed 
out the need for more accessible financing for SMEs.   
Venture capital investment is accomplished through a broad range of vehicles, ranging from 
the injection of seed capital for the development of new products to the acquisition of 
already-established companies. The characteristic which sets venture capitalists apart from 
other sources of financing is the willingness to assume greater risks, thus filling a critical 
gap in the financing available to SMEs. In addition, venture capitalists frequently offer 
strategic management support for the companies in which they invest. This involvement 
helps to ensure the realization of the company's potential growth and improves the venture 
capitalist's opportunity to "exit" profitably from the investment.   
This paper will focus on the role played by venture capital investors in the development of 
SMEs. The paper will canvass the sources of venture capital and distinguish them from 
traditional forms of financing. The examination will then proceed to an analysis of the 
typical objectives of venture capitalists, their role in corporate governance as well as the 
means through which such involvements is accomplished. Finally, the paper will discuss the 
critical role that venture capital (as it relates to SMEs) plays in the industrial development 
of Canada.   
   
   
1. The Continuum of Financing Applicable to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises  
(a) Founder Capital or "Love Money"  
The success or failure of many SMEs in the early stages of their development depends on 
the availability of key start-up capital. Although the amount of required capital at the very 
early stages is typically small, "love money" (also known as founder capital or seed capital) 
is an extremely significant source of this start-up capital. The term "love money" refers to 
capital advanced by the entrepreneur of the SME (including personal loans secured by 
personal property of the entrepreneur such cars and houses), family, friends and 
neighbours.(2) It is estimated that 80-90 percent of early stage financing of $1 million(3) or 
less comes from such sources. (4)  
Love money is of vital importance to the SME as potential outside investors, whether 
institutional or individual lenders, are usually unfamiliar with the business and the 
entrepreneur. Further, such outsiders are usually unprepared to spend the time required on a 
small (and often risky) potential investment to review the entrepreneur's integrity, work 
habits, business plan and management team. This lack of information is particularly 
applicable to the start-up ventures as insiders will typically have better information than 
outside investors concerning the quality and promise of the venture. In addition, the costs 
associated with due diligence required to be conducted by a potential institutional investor 
would be difficult to recover for a small investment. Consequently, venture capitalists, 
merchant bankers and mezzanine financiers frequently avoid investments at the very early 
stages. On the other hand, friends, relatives and associates are willing to inject capital as 
they already have a degree of comfort or trust that would take an outside investor weeks or 
months to duplicate.(5)  
(b) Traditional Loan Financing  
The SME may be able to access traditional loan financing in a few different ways. First, as 
discussed in the preceding section, entrepreneurs often provide valuable start-up capital to 
the enterprise through personal loans secured by the entrepreneur's personal property. 
Second, the loan may be made directly to the enterprise in the form of a line of credit or 
operating loan. Third, SMEs may obtain term loans which may be secured against or may 
be used to purchase fixed assets. Although there are a number of sources of traditional loan 
financing including banks, trust companies and insurance companies, 80% of loans to small 
businesses in Canada are made by the six large Canadian chartered banks.(6)  
The major difficulty facing small firms seeking traditional loan financing in the early stages 
of their development is the lack of "bankable" assets which may be used as collateral to 
secure such financing. These firms often lack the necessary tangible or fixed assets as their 
products have not yet been developed to a point where they can be manufactured and 
marketed. As banks are traditionally risk-averse, they tend to avoid early stage high risk 
ventures, regardless of the potential interest rates or returns associated with such 
investments. Consequently, while still an important financing vehicle, traditional loan 
financing is not often sufficiently available to meet the needs of entrepreneurs at the early 
stages of their ventures' development.(7)  
(c) The Informal Venture Capital (or "Angel") Market  
The second segment of the capital market is the informal venture capital market ("IVC") in 
which individuals, known as "angel" investors, invest directly in small private businesses. 
The substantial size of the Canadian angel market, estimated at $500 million to $1 billion 
per year, makes it a vital factor in obtaining the necessary infusion of capital to proceed to 
the next stage in the development cycle of an SME.(8)  
Angel investors are typically professional investors, retired executives with expertise and 
money or high net worth individuals simply looking for investment opportunities. They tend 
to be highly educated, experienced at the managerial level in small business enterprises and 
have significant wealth and cash flow. The average annual income of an angel investor is 
approximately $175,000 with a net worth of over $1.3 million. (9) Angel investors typically 
learn about investment opportunities from personal contacts, networks of business 
associates, active personal research, accountants and lawyers, friends, magazines and 
newspapers and, to a minor extent, from investment matching services.(10)  
Angel investors reject most projects presented to them. It is estimated that over 72% of all 
projects are rejected before the investors even meet with the entrepreneur with an additional 
16% being rejected after such a meeting. If the potential investment has survived to this 
point, the angel investor will then conduct thorough due diligence of all aspects of the 
investment proposal with less than 3% of all investment proposals ultimately leading to a 
commitment of funds.(11) As a result, the angel investor often holds an obvious balance of 
bargaining power in the entrepreneur's early quest for investment capital.(12)  
On average, angel investments range from $25,000 to $300,000 with an approximate 
average of $125,000.(13) Although most angel investments include the acquisition of equity, 
almost three-quarters of the investors also purchased some form of debt such as convertible 
debentures or debt with warrants attached. The angel investor tends to hold its investments 
for approximately six years and has high expectations of return commensurate with the 
relatively high degree of risk assumed, typically seeking pre-tax gross returns ranging from 
50% to 75% per annum. (14)  
While angel investors usually do not require an active role in the ongoing day-to-day 
management of the enterprise, they often participate in or exercise some degree of control 
over the management of the enterprise through board representation, insistence on operating 
covenants or a shareholders' agreement, providing ongoing consulting services and/or 
periodic documentary review.(15) A discussion of the angel investor's role and participation 
in the enterprise is discussed in greater detail in section 2(c) below.   
(d) The Formal Venture Capital Market  
The next segment of the capital market is the formal venture capital ("FVC") market in 
which wealthy individuals, institutions and government bodies invest money in SMEs 
through the intermediation of formal venture capitalists and professional managers of risk 
capital funds. In 1996, a total of $1.09 billion was invested by members of the Canadian 
venture capital industry through a total of 881 investments made in 525 separate companies, 
of which $749 million (or 69%) of the total value of venture capital investments was made 
in technology-based businesses. At the beginning of 1997, the amount of FVC under 
management in Canada stood at $7.1 billion, up by 19% from the $5.98 billion at the end of 
1995. This growth is not only being influenced by the new flow of capital into the industry 
but also by the tremendous growth in the asset base of the labour-sponsored funds.(16)  
The participants in the FVC market can be categorized in three main groups - the public 
sector, the private sector and the hybrid groups. The public sector, including the federal 
government (eg. the Business Development Bank of Canada) and the provincial 
governments, accounted for only 5% of the total funds invested in 1996, down from 8% in 
1991. The private sector, which is comprised primarily of private independent funds 
(funded by wealthy individuals and institutions such as pension funds and insurance 
companies) and financial corporations accounted for approximately 53% of the total market 
in 1996, down from 67% in 1991.(17) The last sector, primarily comprised of labour 
sponsored venture capital funds and selected immigrant investor funds, is the most rapidly 
growing sector in the industry. These funds are labelled hybrid because of the fact that they 
are run privately but receive assistance from the various levels of government through the 
provision of favourable tax credits and other like incentives to investors of such funds.(18) In 
1996, the hybrid funds invested a total of $453 million in the Canadian market, which 
accounted for approximately 42% of the total market, up from 25% from 1991.(19)  
While formal venture capitalists rarely finance companies during their very early start-up 
phase, approximately 43% of the funds invested by such investors in 1996 were invested in 
early stage financing, when the company is beginning commercial manufacturing and 
selling its product and, consequently, needs additional capital to scale-up its output. An 
additional 45% of the FVC invested in 1996 was invested in the expansion stage or 
mezzanine financing where the company is in the last stage of financing before an initial 
public offering or buy-out.(20) This financing is typically provided to companies that are the 
stage of either breaking even or reaching profitability, and is provided in order to effect 
further expansion in sales and manufacturing, for working capital or for new product 
development.   
Typically, the investments made in the FVC market tend to be much larger than the 
investments in the IVC market. Whereas the average IVC investment in 1996 was 
approximately $125,000, the average investments for the public sector and for both the 
private and hybrid sectors in the FVC market was $570,000 and $1.3 million, 
respectively.(21)  
Given the high amount of risk attributable to investments in these types of enterprises, most 
venture capitalists seek to participate in the upside performance of the enterprise and expect 
an average return of 25% to 40% per year on their investments. Furthermore, 41% of the 
investments made in the FVC market in 1996 consisted of common shares alone while only 
6% consisted of only preferred shares.(22) Even when debt is issued, the venture capitalist 
often obtains some form of residual claim in the enterprise's potential through instruments 
such as convertible debt, debt with equity warrants or combinations of debt and common 
shares. This type of hybrid debt accounted for over 20% of the investments made in 
1996.(23)  
FVC investors usually anticipate holding their investments for a period of three to eight 
years.(24) Although the extent of the participation of the formal venture capitalist in the day-
to-day affairs of the enterprise varies between investors, formal venture capitalists generally 
require some degree of active involvement. This involvement may include a seat on the 
board of directors, an active monitoring role or even day-to-day participation. A discussion 
of the formal venture capitalist's role and participation in the enterprise is discussed in 
greater detail in section 2© below.   
(e) The Participation of Canadian Chartered Banks in the Venture Capital Market  
In the past, Canadian chartered banks have been involved in the venture capital market only 
to a small extent. The chartered banks are typically highly risk-averse in their investment 
decisions, preferring to rely on the aggregate sum of small profits from a large volume of 
transactions. By contrast, venture capital investing entails a relatively high degree of risk. It 
may also require extensive monitoring, with the attendant costs.(25) However, there are 
indications that this trend may be changing. In order to address the "commercialization gap" 
or "company creation gap" in growth sectors such as information technologies as well as 
advanced materials and manufacturing, several banks have established subsidiaries which 
engage in venture capital investment. These venture capital subsidiaries focus on specialty 
manufacturing, the export sector and knowledge-based industries (eg. the Bank of Montreal 
Technology Investment Program). These venture capital subsidiaries possess investment 
funds of up to $350 million, some of which are managed by independent venture capital 
firms.(26) The amounts invested range from $250,000 to $20,000,000 per company, with 
relatively long-term investment horizons of three to seven years.(27)  
(f) Initial Public Offerings  
SMEs often reach a stage in their life cycle where a public financing may be appropriate to 
raise the necessary funds and to access the public equity markets. An initial public offering, 
in which the enterprise offers its securities to the public for the first time, provides a number 
of advantages to the enterprise including:   
(I) a wider range of potential investors;   
(ii) increased liquidity;   
(iii) an exit mechanism for early stage investors including venture capitalists;   
(iv) greater ease to raise money; and   
(v) an enhanced public profile. (28)  
Although the enterprise may reap the rewards of becoming a public company, there are a 
number of costs and drawbacks applicable to becoming a public company, particularly to a 
smaller public entity. Financial costs associated with taking the company public (eg. legal 
and audit fees, securities regulatory filing costs, underwriter's commissions, printing costs, 
etc.) and with regulatory continuous disclosure obligations can be somewhat burdensome. 
In addition, the large amount of regulatory involvement attributable to public companies 
may result in indirect costs such as slower decision making, as well as a loss of 
confidentiality and autonomy. Moreover, the diversion of management's time may make the 
enterprise less responsive and may divert valuable resources away from the crucial task of 
the ongoing management of the enterprise.(29) Finally, many of these direct and indirect 
costs are borne disproportionately by SMEs, given the high percentage of fixed costs and 
underwriter commissions per initial public offering, the lack of available managerial 
resources and expert advisors and the lengthier delays before funds are ultimately 
received. (30)  
(g) Exit Mechanisms  
As noted above, both informal and formal venture capitalists desire to dispose of their 
investments in the SME within a certain time period. Depending on the SME's stage of 
development and its financial and operating position, there are a number of different exit 
mechanisms available to the venture capitalist.   
The most common exit mechanism of Canadian venture capitalists is by way of a buyback 
of the venture capitalist's shares by the enterprise itself. In fact, approximately 46% of the 
exit mechanisms in Canada in both 1996 and 1995 occurred by company buy-back although 
the venture capitalist earned only 1.2 times its original cost on its investment (1.8 times 
their investment in 1995) by this exit mechanism. By contrast, initial public offerings 
(discussed above) represented 8.8% of the number of dispositions in 1996 (16.5% in 1995) 
but returned to the venture capitalists more than 6.5 times the original cost (5.1 times in 
1995). Furthermore, approximately 7.7% of all disposition mechanisms in both 1995 and 
1996 were achieved by a third-party acquiring the SME. The remaining exit mechanisms 
consisted of write-offs (9.3%), mergers (3.3%), and secondary sales (25.3%).(31)  
   
   
2. The Link Between Venture Capital Investment Objectives and Control Over the 
Enterprise   
(a) Introduction  
As noted above, the venture capitalist will generally have a number of objectives relating to 
the return on its investment, the protection of its investment and the time horizon until 
disposition. This section will review the methods by which the venture capitalist can meet 
its investment objectives by focusing on the various types of financing instruments 
available.   
The venture capitalist will also have varying objectives as to the degree of involvement and 
participation in the SME. For example, the venture capitalist often seeks to spend more time 
and effort monitoring the entrepreneur/manager than would a traditional banker. Further, 
many venture capitalists, when making their investment, desire to monitor the viability and 
performance of the enterprise and, ultimately, on their investment while, at the same time, 
avoiding involvement in the ongoing day-to-day management of the enterprise.(32) This 
section will canvass the various types of roles the venture capitalist may play in the SME's 
development cycle and the corresponding methods of achieving these goals. While this 
section will treat both the IVC market and the FVC market as one, any differences will be 
duly noted.   
(b) Investment Objectives  
The venture capitalist's objective of participating in the upside of the enterprise is met by 
maintaining an equity position and a claim on the residual value of the company. However, 
as the entrepreneur will invariably refuse to give up control of the enterprise, an outside 
investor who acquires only a minority equity position would be in a somewhat vulnerable 
position relating to the management of the business.   
One of the most effective methods of meeting the venture capitalist's goal of participating in 
the upside of the enterprise while still reducing its risk exposure is to purchase a 
combination of debt and equity or a form of debt convertible into equity securities. In the 
case of the combination of debt and equity, the investor, through the particular debt 
instrument, may be able to maintain discipline in the enterprise through covenants which 
must be met by the enterprise on an ongoing basis. Further, the injection of capital through 
debt affords the venture capitalist the ability to register a security interest against the assets 
of the enterprise and thus elevating its status in the enterprise above unsecured creditors and 
shareholders (although likely subordinate to any applicable bank financing). On the other 
hand, the investor can still participate in the enterprise's growth potential through its equity 
participation.(33)  
A method which is similar to the combination of debt and equity is a debt instrument, such 
as a convertible debenture, which is convertible into equity of the enterprise at the option of 
the holder or upon the occurrence of particular events. As noted above, the debt holder will 
be able to secure its investment against the assets of the enterprise while maintaining the 
added protection that debt provides. Further, depending upon the terms of the convertible 
debt, its holder may be able to convert the debt into equity securities, thus taking advantage 
of the potential earnings and increase in value of the enterprise. (34)  
(c) Management of the Enterprise  
The marriage of the skills and experience which are brought by the venture capitalist and 
the entrepreneur is a classic example of creating synergies in an economic environment 
where their respective abilities and talents complement one another. The relationship 
between the two is not stagnant but, rather, evolves over time as the venture capitalist sees 
that the entrepreneur matures in his management experience, style and philosophy. 
Similarly, the controls which the venture capitalist may require or impose at the outset may, 
explicitly or implicitly, be lessened over time as the enterprise flourishes and the venture 
capitalist senses that the controls may no longer be necessary or appropriate, or in 
circumstances where the entrepreneur has independently been able to negotiate the removal 
or relaxing of the constraints.   
If purchasing equity, whether alone or in conjunction with a debt instrument, one of the key 
protection vehicles available to the venture capitalist is through the creation of a 
shareholders agreement which governs the business and affairs of the enterprise. In 
particular, the shareholders agreement will typically (a) provide the investor with a degree 
of control in the enterprise (providing, for example, that certain types of decisions may not 
be made or implemented without special corporate approvals having been obtained, which 
approvals may include a veto right in favour of the venture capitalist); (b) dictate the rules 
relating to the issuance and disposition of equity securities; and (c) dictate the rules relating 
to the injection of future financing.(35)  
It is important to note that the ability of the venture capitalist to obtain one or more of the 
following mechanisms will invariably depend upon the relevant strengths of the venture 
capitalist in relation to the entrepreneur's bargaining position as well as the availability of 
competing equity sources.   
Early in the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, each develops 
a respect for the abilities of the other, and takes seriously (and frequently defers to) the 
expertise of the other. The venture capitalist respects the motivation and drive of the 
entrepreneur who has developed a concept, established a business within a predetermined 
niche, and has shown (by virtue of historical results) a predisposition towards the success of 
that business. The entrepreneur, on the other hand, respects the experience and knowledge 
of the capital markets which the venture capitalist brings to the relationship, and the 
experience which has been applied in other situations in expanding business operations 
from one plateau to a higher level. At the outset, each brings to the relationship knowledge, 
experience and perspective which is crucial to the successful development and advancement 
of the enterprise's operations. The ambitious enthusiasm of the entrepreneur is tempered 
with the pragmatism and experience of the venture capitalist, but the constant interaction 
between the two applied towards the common goal of the enterprise's success are critical in 
achieving that mission. Over time, as the business grows and the entrepreneur's abilities 
have been proven, and as the venture capitalist grows more comfortable with placing its 
destiny in the entrepreneur's decision-making, controls and vetoes are resorted to far less 
frequently and may in fact be taken out of the formal relationship between the parties.   
(i) Role in Corporate Governance   
Since venture capitalists often have previous managerial and entrepreneurial experience, 
many see their role in the enterprise as more than simply providers of equity. Rather, they 
see themselves as providers of value and expertise. Furthermore, while most venture 
capitalists wish to avoid participating in the ongoing management of the enterprise on a 
day-to-day basis (other than in instances of crisis management), many seek to monitor the 
management by insisting on one or more seats on the board of directors of the enterprise. 
Through such an appointment, the investors seek to be apprised of important issues facing 
the enterprise and thus be able to track their investments more closely as well as to provide 
input to management on ultimate decisions. Consequently, many venture capitalists insist 
that the debt instrument or shareholders agreement provide for representation on the board 
of directors by the venture capitalist or its nominees. (36)  
Although the venture capitalist will rarely have a majority equity position in the enterprise, 
and will therefore not be able to control the decisions made by the board of directors, debt 
instruments or shareholders agreements often provide that no decisions may be made 
without the venture capitalist or its nominee being present at the board meeting at which 
such decisions are made. Further, debt instruments or shareholders agreements often 
provide that certain types of transactions will not be approved without the prior consent of 
the venture capitalist or its board nominee, including:   
   
• amendments to the enterprise's governing documents (i.e. articles of incorporation, 
by-laws);  
• any type of corporate reorganization such as amalgamations, mergers or 
liquidations  
• appointment and election of officers and directors and the compensation paid to such 
officers and directors  
• the entering into of agreements with and the making of any payments to any 
shareholder of the enterprise  
• issuances, redemptions or other dealings with the securities of the enterprise 
(including the granting of stock options)  
• incurring new debt and the mortgaging, pledging or otherwise granting of security 
interests in the property or assets of the enterprise  
• declaration of dividends, the return of capital or the retirement of any indebtedness 
of the enterprise  
• the sale, lease, exchange or disposition of all or substantially all of the property or 
assets of the enterprise  
• any other decisions out of the ordinary course of the enterprise's business(37)  
(ii) Buy-Sell Provisions   
Shareholders agreements often contain provisions known as "buy-sell provisions" which 
dictate a number of different mechanisms to deal with the purchase and sale of securities of 
a corporation, whether pursuant to a mandatory obligation or an option to buy or sell the 
securities. These types of provisions typically fall into two categories - those which 
contemplate some involvement of a third party and those which involve only the 
shareholders of the corporation. The first type, where third party involvement is 
contemplated, includes provisions such as"right of first refusal", "piggyback rights" and 
"drag along rights". The second type, which involves only existing shareholders, includes 
"shotguns", "puts" and "calls".(38)  
For the venture capitalist, the buy-sell provisions are a key component of any shareholders 
agreement. First, provisions such as the right of first refusal provide the venture capitalist 
with the ability to exert control over the process of new investors purchasing outstanding 
securities in the corporation, thus avoiding undesirable or incompatible new shareholders. If 
the venture capitalist is opposed to the proposed purchaser, it can simply exercise its right of 
first refusal and purchase the securities itself.   
Next, buy-sell provisions such as "drag-along rights" and "puts" enhance liquidity in the 
private enterprise's shares and may act as a valid exit mechanism for the venture capitalist to 
dispose of its investment when it reaches an optimal disposition time. For instance, the 
marketability of the venture capitalist's investment clearly increases if it has the ability to 
force other shareholders to sell their shares to a potential third party purchaser. Similarly, 
the "put" allows the venture capitalist to require existing shareholders and/or the enterprise 
itself (assuming they have the requisite funds) to purchase its shares at an optimal time on 
the venture capitalist's investment horizon.   
(iii) Additional Financings    
Given the fact that most venture capital funds are provided in the earlier stages of an 
enterprise's development, the enterprise will often require additional financing at a later date 
to meet increased capital demands associated with a developing and expanding business. 
Consequently, in order to protect its investment in relation to any new financings, 
shareholders agreements often provide the venture capitalist with certain rights relating to 
future financings such as (a) an approval or veto right; (b) a pre-emptive right to participate 
in the subsequent financing on a pro rata basis in order not to have its interests diluted; or 
(c) a requirement that all shareholders participate in the subsequent financing. This last 
provisions may be enforceable either by permitting the non-defaulting's shareholders to 
advance the defaulter's share on its behalf and thus creating an enforceable debt obligation 
in favour of the non-defaulting shareholders or by permitting the dilution or forfeiture of the 
investment of the defaulting shareholder.(39)  
   
   
3. The Critical Role of SMEs in Industrial Development in Canada   
SMEs constitute the majority of enterprises in Canada. They are vital to the maintenance of 
high employment as well as current and future economic prosperity.   
Prior to the 1980s, the Canadian economy relied heavily on resource-based activities, 
branch plant manufacturing operations and the services required to support these core 
activities. Most Canadian companies could focus on the North American market without 
concerning themselves with major competition from other world markets. However, 
following the recession in the early 1980s, many resource-based companies declined due to 
depressed commodity prices. Further, at the same time, globalization and technology 
advancements dramatically altered the comparative advantage of advanced industrial 
nations. Developing countries began to produce labour-intensive goods at low prices and 
market them to the industrialized world. Economies moved away from mass-produced, 
standardized products toward highly differentiated, specialized products. The Canadian 
dependence on a commodity and resource based economy diminished as production of 
knowledge intensive goods and services increased. Consequently, Canadian companies 
began to realize the necessity for international competitiveness through the advent of 
technology.   
The creation of wealth by high-growth firms is key to meeting the new challenges of global 
competition. Rather than being a handicap, the size of the SMEs represents a clear 
advantage, as it makes it easier to sustain innovation and an entrepreneurial spirit. At their 
best, the SMEs continuously improve their production methods, employ organizational 
flexibility and problem-solving at all levels, as well as engage in pro-active, long-term 
planning. This argument is supported by economic developments throughout the world. As 
noted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, several of the most 
prosperous and competitive economies in the world today are based on small firms. By 
contrast, the countries whose economies have declined have generally adhered inflexibly to 
large-scale mass production, standardized production methods, rigid approaches to 
management, reactive and short-term planning, as well as innovation reserved for a select 
group of experts.(40)  
The success of companies involved in the development, marketing, manufacturing and 
delivery of technologically advanced products or services is largely dependent on 
innovation resulting from their own research or research acquired from similar entities. 
However, these types of companies can achieve their goals only if a suitable financial and 
managerial infrastructure is available. Venture capitalists, as the early-stage financiers of 
emerging growth firms, are a key element in that infrastructure.   
There are numerous concrete indications of the crucial importance of the SME to the 
Canadian economy. Businesses with fewer than 100 employees accounted for 
approximately 49.5% of Canada's employment in 1993, reflecting an increase from 44.5% 
in 1983. Large companies with more than 500 employees experienced the most sizable 
decrease in the share of the Canadian labour market between 1983 and 1993.(41) By contrast, 
between the second quarter of 1995 and the second quarter of 1997, SMEs produced 76% of 
the 980,000 new jobs created in Canada.(42)  
In addition, because research and development is one of the most significant determinants 
of the success of the SME, such firms tend to spend significant amounts of capital on 
innovation. For example, firms with less than $1 million in sales spend proportionately two 
to three times more on research and development than their larger counterparts. Although 
the top 100 companies in Canada accounted for 67% of the research and development in 
1993, this number represents a decrease from 77% in 1973. Also, the number of firms 
spending funds on research and development between 1984 and 1993 increased from 1,800 
(43)
to 4,000. It is reported that SMEs accounted for the majority of this new participation.(43)  
Finally, the SMEs are increasingly essential to the maintenance of Canada's trade surplus. 
Although SMEs accounted for only 8.5% of the value of Canadian exports in 1995 ($21 
billion), the number of SMEs exporting has grown rapidly - from 33,000 in 1986 to 73,000 
in 1992. Moreover, the SMEs are the driving force behind the industries in which Canada is 
beginning to capture new markets, particularly the rapidly growing technology and service 
fields.(44)  
   
4. Conclusion  
The diverse forms of venture capital available to SMEs fill a critical financing void, which 
might otherwise prevent many businesses from coming into being or flourishing. Both the 
informal and formal venture capital investors are willing to assume a relatively high degree 
of risk by injecting capital into emergent companies which often have little or no tangible 
collateral. The venture capitalists expect to gain a significant degree of control over the 
business strategy, in order to ensure that the enterprise develops favourably, provides an 
attractive rate of return on the investment and allows them an opportunity to exit profitably. 
Statistics indicate that SMEs have been playing an increasingly important role in economic 
development including a major role in job creation in Canada. In addition, participation by 
the SMEs in the export market and in the area of research and development has increased. 
Consequently, the economic growth of the SMEs carries with it a corresponding increase in 
the significance of the investors who enable the them to develop.   
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